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MORS ORAL HISTORY
Interview with Dr. Paul K. Davis, FS.
Dr. Bob Sheldon, FS, interviewer.
Bob Sheldon: This is December 17, 2015,
and we’re here for a MORS oral history in-
terview with Paul Davis. Paul, first of all,
please give us your parents’ names.
Paul Davis:RuthGledhill and Paul Davis.
Bob Sheldon:What kind of influence did
your parents have on you?
Paul Davis: The narrow answer is that
they had no influence on what I did, where
I went to school, anything like that. But they
had a broad influence. Both had some col-
lege, considered themselves educated, and
expected their kids would go to college
and then do well. There always were books
everywhere, which everyone in the family
read. They had no interest in or knowledge
of science. Science is just what I decided to
do and that was fine with them.
Bob Sheldon:Where did you go to grade
school and junior high and high school?
Paul Davis: I grew up in a fairly small
town in northeastern Ohio called Niles
(16,000 people). We had lots of things to
do: Boy Scouts and Explorer Scouts, YMCA,
swimming pools, and a lot of things that
you associate with ‘‘Happy Days.’’ I walked
to all of my schools and knew many class-
mates from first grade on (and some others
from ninth grade on).
Bob Sheldon:Did you take an early inter-
est in math and science?
Paul Davis: Math came easily and I
didn’t think about it. I was busy playing,
and reading books that were more fun—
historical fiction, mystery stories, adventure,
biographies, war books (e.g., Run Silent, Run
Deep), even books on ESP and flying saucers.
It wasn’t until high school that I became in-
terested in math and science.
Bob Sheldon:Did you take a full range of
math in high school, up through calculus?
Paul Davis: We had plane geometry,
solid geometry, algebra, trigonometry, and
a year of analytic geometry and calculus.
Both my math teachers were retired mili-
tary. My friends and I loved them. They
were proud, patriotic, smart, and tough on
us. And they loved math. I suspect that
many retiring military officers would find
teaching to be very rewarding (except for
money). I taught calculus when I was in
grad school and found it delightful.
Bob Sheldon: What about science?
Paul Davis: Biology, chemistry, and
physics. Also, I got up at 6 a.m. to watch
televised college-level courses, ‘‘Sunrise
Semester,’’ in chemistry and math. I didn’t
take them for credit, but I got the texts,
which were more interesting than my high
school books.
Bob Sheldon: Were you involved in any
extracurricular activities in high school?
Paul Davis: I wish that I could say foot-
ball and basketball because all of us in Niles
were avid fans of both, but I was not suited
for those after junior high. But there was
tennis, driveway-level basketball, chorus,
Boys State, Junior Red Cross, and other
community activities. I also worked from
junior high on, so that was part of my extra-
curricular stuff.
Bob Sheldon: What kind of work?
Paul Davis: First I was a newspaper boy.
Back then, some of us would carry papers in
bags and walk for miles. Also, lawn mow-
ing, working in a department store, and
even some selling (which I didn’t enjoy). It
was what I could do as a kid.
Bob Sheldon: How did you choose your
college?
Paul Davis: Nobody in my family or
school had a clue about where to go to col-
lege without money; and we had none.
My principal urged me to apply to West
Point, which would have been great, but I
was not physically constructed for that kind
of thing. Two close friends, however, went
to Annapolis and the Air Force Academy.
Anyway, I bought some books and applied
to a bunch of schools without really know-
ing what I was doing in detail (there were
no books on the top 50 schools back then
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a lot of great choices and the question was
where to go.
I ended up going to University of Michigan,
which was a wise choice. Part of it was prag-
matic: they gave me a full scholarship. Beyond
that, visiting the university was like seeing into
a new, big wide world. I never looked back.
Bob Sheldon:What year did you start at Ann
Arbor?
Paul Davis: 1961.
Bob Sheldon: Did you declare a major when
you started there?
Paul Davis: Chemistry, tentatively. I was in
the College of Literature, Science, and the Arts.
That included the sciences, but also English,
philosophy, history, and so forth. Pretty quickly
I became a confirmed chemistrymajor. That was
because of the interest from high school, espe-
cially in chemistry theory.
Bob Sheldon:What did you take as a chemis-
try major?
Paul Davis: We had general, inorganic, or-
ganic, and physical chemistry, and lots of labo-
ratories. I enjoyed those, but wasn’t as good at
them. I had to step back and think about the ex-
periments before I walked in, whereas some of
my friends were like natural chefs. If I didn’t
prepare well, I’d mess things up or break glass.
I also took a fair amount of physics and
math, and also some liberal arts courses in En-
glish, philosophy, history, and constitutional law.
Bob Sheldon: Did you have any particularly
notable professors in your undergraduate stud-
ies at Michigan?
Paul Davis: Michigan did well by its under-
graduates. A philosophy professor, Charles
Stevenson, liked teaching undergraduates be-
cause they hadn’t yet confronted the issues that
he had devoted his career to. He told us that if
we had some great deep thoughts as we wrote
our papers, they were ‘‘ours,’’ even if a Greek
philosopher had had the same thoughts long
ago. That was comforting and I remember it to-
day. A more famous professor, Abraham Kaplan,
had studied under Rudolf Carnap and Bertrand
Russell, and in the Far East. He epitomized
breadth and taught a comparative political phi-
losophy course, which was deeply insightful.
As Kaplan said of himself: ‘‘I am by training
a positivist, by inclination a pragmatist, in tem-
perament a mystic, in practice a democrat; my
faith Jewish, educated by Catholics, a habitual
Protestant; born in Europe, raised in the Mid-
west, hardened in the East, softened inCalifornia,
and living in Israel.’’ One chemistry professor
(Seymour Blinder) was very impressive to me
and a small group of theory-oriented friends. I
also had an excellent organic chemistry professor.
The first semester was all theory and it was won-
derful. We used a textbook by Donald Cram and
George Hammond (UCLA and Cal Tech). Cram
later got a Nobel Prize. You can understand a
great deal of organic chemistry from the theory.
But then came all the stuff that you couldn’t un-
derstand. That was the art, the alchemy. It
didn’t do much for me.
Bob Sheldon:What were your thoughts com-
ing up on graduation in 1965?
Paul Davis: I thought about a lot of things. I
took the Law School Aptitude Test and got the
application for Harvard. My roommate, who
later went to Harvard, always insisted that I
should have gone that route and would have
loved it. I also looked at biophysics. I applied
to several schools and was accepted, but when
I got accepted at MIT (the Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology) and read up on some of
the things that they did in the Department of
Chemistry, I liked that and decided to go there.
I certainly did not do a detailed decision analysis,
but the decision felt good and it turned out well.
Bob Sheldon:What was your specialty at MIT?
Paul Davis: Within the department, there
was inorganic, organic, and physical chemistry.
Andwithin physical chemistry there was chem-
ical physics and physical chemistry. I gravitated
into theoretical chemical physics, into what’s
called ‘‘statistical physics’’ or ‘‘statistical me-
chanics.’’ The first year of classes was broad
and some was great fun: kinetic theory of gases,
spectroscopy, and statistical mechanics. Also,
teaching freshmen. Some of my best courses,
however, were in the physics department. The
graduate-level quantum mechanics course was
profound and inspirational. I also sat in on lec-
tures in general relativity by Steven Weinberg,
who later got a Nobel Prize. Beautiful stuff.
Bob Sheldon: Did you go there intending just
to get a master’s degree or did you apply for the
PhD program?
Paul Davis: In chemistry, a master’s degree
was a consolation prize, so I never got a master’s.
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Bob Sheldon: How did you choose your dis-
sertation topic?
Paul Davis: I chose a professor, Irwin
Oppenheim. After enjoying his first course, I
askedwhether he could takeme on as a student.
He would give frightening verbal tests to scare
us off, and draw curves pointing out that most
people who try to contribute to his kind of work
had a net negative effect on the world. But if we
didn’t scare off, then he would take us on.
He would try out a problem on a student,
and—if it resonated—that became their disser-
tation topic. If it didn’t, then hewould try a differ-
ent one. The first problem I had was appropriate
for a pure mathematician who didn’t really care
about the physics or chemistry. I had neither the
mathematical brilliance nor the interest to appre-
ciate it, sohe changedgears andsuggestedaprob-
lem that I spent the next several years on. It was
also deeplymathematical, but close to fundamen-
tal physics and chemistry. It required using a ver-
sion of quantum mechanics that related well to
abstract classical physics. It traced back to Eugene
Wigner in the early 1930s. There was, let’s say,
a ‘‘significant learning curve,’’ but after that the
theory was beautiful and remarkably intuitive.
Oppenheim died last year and his old grad-
uate students got together in Cambridge for a cel-
ebration of his life. He was a brilliant scientist,
fine advisor, and an exceptionally broad human.
Bob Sheldon:How long did it take you to fin-
ish your PhD?
Paul Davis: Five years; most of that was
dissertation.
Bob Sheldon: What was your dissertation
topic?
Paul Davis: Stochastic Theories of Energy
Transfer. It was about vibrational relaxation in
gases and liquids. The liquids part was an
add-on. I didn’t realize that was coming. I
thought I was done when I finished the gas part.
Instead, I was told ‘‘That’s great. Now do liq-
uids and you’re done.’’ From his point of view,
there had been some hints on how to go about
the problem for gases, but for liquids there
was no clue. So solving the problem was en-
tirely on the graduate student. He once told
me that he picked dissertation problems such
that, if he personally focused on a given prob-
lem, he could crack it in six months. He figured
a good student could do it in a few years. That
was a bit humbling to hear, but accurate for
my cohort of students.
Bob Sheldon:Howmuch of your dissertation
work was in the lab versus theoretical?
Paul Davis:Mine was strictly theoretical, ex-
cept that I had to look around to see whether
there was experimental confirmation of what I
was coming up with. There wasn’t: the more
meaningful experiments hadn’t been done yet.
Some required unusual isotopes with special
characteristics. That was a bit disappointing,
but I had no doubt about the dissertation being
correct.
Bob Sheldon: Finishing up your PhD, what
were your job plans?
Paul Davis: Academic work. I took a two-
year postdoc at the University of Chicago and
found myself bored. It wasn’t as interesting as
at MIT, but more importantly, I was looking at
the folks who were a year ahead of me trying
to get real jobs. They were going to mediocre
schools, or to very good collegeswithno research.
I concluded I wouldn’t be satisfied with either.
A friend then called and asked me to apply
to the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA).
Reading the Enthoven-Smith book, How Much
Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961–1969,
on the airplane, I concluded that therewas impor-
tant work to be done in defense analysis. I then
met the folks at IDA and thought, ‘‘These are re-
ally interesting people.’’ So the next thing I knew,
I had taken a job. I had also gotten a more lucra-
tive offer in the chemistry industry, but I had
turned a corner.
Bob Sheldon: What year was that?
Paul Davis: 1972.
Bob Sheldon:Who did you interview with at
IDA?
Paul Davis: Themanagers were Bob Fox and
Bill Schultis. Bill was an excellent systems ana-
lyst who would see through the fog to the es-
sence. The hiring committee included Roger
Molander, Philip Selwyn, and FennerMilton—all
of whom later had distinguished careers in de-
fense research. It was an impressive bunch of
people. A lot of decisions get based on whether
you like the people.
Bob Sheldon: What kind of project did they
assign you initially?
Paul Davis: The Navy was just beginning
to field the F-14, which was like the F-35
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today—controversial, expensive, very cutting
edge. OSD (Office of Secretary of Defense)
didn’t really know what the airplane could
and couldn’t do (the Navy kept information
close hold). My job was to do an assessment
for OSD on how we should look at the F-14
and anticipate what upgrades might be needed
down the pike. So I spent time with the NAVAIR
(Naval Air Systems Command) people, learning
the rudiments of air defense and so on, trying
to be structured and candid about what the
airplane could and could not do, what the
limitations were, and what might therefore
be needed later. So, this was where I first learned
systems analysis.
Bob Sheldon: Did you have to learn how to
study air-to-air combat and air-to-ground combat?
Paul Davis: My project was more elemen-
tary, things like, ‘‘What does it take to maintain
combat air patrol at various distances?’’ ‘‘How
big an attack on the air fleet could be defended
against?’’ The worry was attack by Soviet
bombers, which were getting standoff missiles.
So it was that level of analysis: not very hard,
but interesting, technical, and consequential.
I then started working on a DARPA (De-
fense Advanced Research Projects Agency) pro-
gram that had to do with satellite observations
of rocket exhaust plumes. We and the Soviets
would launch missiles, which could be tracked
with satellites and their exhaust plumes ob-
served, perhaps suggesting things about missile
characteristics (I worked out a theory for esti-
mating throw-weight from such data). The pro-
gram had a lot of experimental work as well as
theory. IDA was advising at a high level. Hans
Wolfhard, a respected scientist who had emi-
grated from Germany after World War II, was
in charge and was also my mentor. I was able
to work with people who were doing outstand-
ing aerodynamic, chemical dynamics, and em-
pirical work, but who were unable to see the
whole because they were so deep into their
own work. The program was fragmented,
but—as sometimes happens in a DARPA pro-
gram with first-rate people—it fell together.
BobSheldon:Wasit classifiedcompartmentalized?
Paul Davis: It had been, but it became just
classified.
Bob Sheldon:Who did you brief the results of
your analysis to?
Paul Davis: The program manager at DARPA
and the head of the office of Strategic Technol-
ogy. In a way, however, the whole community
of people that had been contributing to the pro-
gram were my customers, because the IDA job
was to pull things together. People were de-
pressed because they couldn’t understand the
empirical observations that had contradictory
conclusions. But I was able to put together a re-
markably simple model, which was motivated
by work with the individuals about how to sim-
plify what they had done, and then putting this
together in a formula model that made sense.
Given the simplifications, it was supposed to
be for explanation and communication. How-
ever, it also fit the data extremely well. When I
briefed the model and how it integrated the var-
ious strands of work, the many contributors to
the program were really excited (and relieved).
That was a high for me.
Ironically, the boss at DARPA had con-
cluded the program was a failure. And then
we came in with this report where everything
fell together. That discombobulated him for
a while.
Bob Sheldon:Howmany rocket launches did
you have data on?
Paul Davis: Probably tens, between Ameri-
can and Soviet launches. We also had experi-
ments from aircraft and shock-tube laboratory
experiments.
Bob Sheldon: What was your next project
at IDA?
Paul Davis: I did some work for NASA, but
then in 1975 I went into the government. This
was back in the days of strategic arms control,
which seemed tome deeply worthwhile despite
my strong pro-defense attitudes. I took a risk
andwent to work for the Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency (ACDA), knowing that I
couldn’t stay long or I’d be tainted for future de-
fense work. The very name ‘‘Arms Control and
Disarmament’’ made me nervous because I had
never believed in total disarmament (or even
eliminating nuclear weapons). But ACDA was
a big player in the analysis that underlay the
strategic talks. Each study had a rep from
OSD, JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff), State, CIA (Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency), and ACDA. ACDA
was a small agency, so a young guy could get
into the action fast.
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Bob Sheldon: Was that part of the State De-
partment at the time?
Paul Davis: It was administratively attached
to the State Department, but was a separate
agency by legislation.
A lucky thing was that, at the time, scien-
tists could inform policy because some of the is-
sues were, e.g., how can we limit and verify the
throw weight of the next-generation nuclear
missiles, how can we verifiably define a MIRV
(multiple independently targetable re-entry ve-
hicle), how would we expect the Soviets to ex-
ploit loopholes in language or actually cheat,
or is Minuteman really vulnerable? Later, the is-
sues become more political.
Bob Sheldon:When you were at ACDA, was
Al Lieberman, FS there?
Paul Davis: Al headed the operations re-
search division. I was in a different group that
was closer to policy and strategy. We cooper-
ated. I remember liking Al very much and ad-
miring his integrity (some of the higher-ups
didn’t like some of the results of good analysis).
While housed in ACDA, I waswriting inter-
agency papers for the National Security Council
(NSC). I would have a co-author from OSD,
Joint Staff, CIA, or State. There were fierce, even
emotional arguments. But people came to re-
spect each other. I can remember being at a table
over in the Old Executive Office Building when
one of themilitary people accused one of the civil-
ians on the other side of the table of being a com-
munist. But we had the proverbial beers together
afterward. By the way, those of us who interacted
with Soviet scientists came also to respect them
highly. There is no substitute for face-to-face
meetings with adversaries (as well as allies).
I also did some work on far-out space is-
sues, involving antisatellite systems, possible
arms control in space, etc.
Anyway, in 1977, I was asked to go over to
OSD Program Analysis & Evaluation (PA&E)
(now CAPE, Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation) to work in the strategic nuclear
analysis shop on both force planning and arms
control.
Bob Sheldon:While at ACDAorOSDdid you
get to know Lieutenant General Glenn Kent?
Paul Davis: I didn’t know Glenn until
later, at RAND, where we spent many, many
happy hours talking, debating, and sometimes
working through logic or math. I doubt that
anyone ever ‘‘won’’ a debate with him, but I held
my own and we had a good time. While I was
in OSD, an important player was Major General
Jasper Welch. He had succeeded Kent as head of
Air Force Studies and Analysis (AFSA). There
was someOSD-AF tension, of course, but alsogood
cooperation among analysts. We were all building
programs and protecting the nation. It was the
Cold War with serious things to worry about.
Oddly, some of the issues have come back.
For example, our big study in 1978 was whether
to modernize the ICBM force or scrap it, and
whether to have a Triad. The same issues have
come up again 40 years later.
Bob Sheldon:How longwere you there at OSD?
Paul Davis:After a year or so doing strategic
nuclear planning and thinking, ‘‘I really under-
stand this stuff,’’ the head of PA&E, Russell
Murray (a terrific analyst and leader), insisted
that I become a senior executive and take a divi-
sion to do something completely different. The
division was called Special Regional Studies
(I’m not sure why). We were actually looking
at the Persian Gulf region. The NSC, Zbigniew
Brzezinski in particular, had asked the Depart-
ment of Defense (DoD) to look at US problems
in that part of the world. So I was put in charge
of the division that did that, under Paul
Wolfowitz, the Deputy for Regional Programs.
So I became a strategic analyst in a different
sense. I had to learn about ground warfare,
strategic mobility, etc. Wow, the ignorance of
a civilian when first looking at groundwarfare!
Fortunately, I had some young colonels
assigned to the office, and they would patiently
tutor me on things such as why armies don’t
move nearly as fast as one might think, or how
army officers look at a map and think out what
forces would be needed for a particular situa-
tion. So I had a lot to learn, but I could think
and write; apparently, I had a sense of strategy.
I also benefited fromworking for Paul Wolfowitz
and often with Andy Marshall, the Director of
Net Assessment, both of whom I have always
greatly respected and liked.
That was a great period because we were
filling a vacuum. The US had no military capa-
bility in the Persian Gulf. So we did a big study
(the ‘‘Wolfowitz study’’) about different things
that could happen, no one of which was
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expected. We were doing capabilities analysis
and we ended up recommending more sealift,
more airlift, expeditionary forces, base im-
provements, and even a new command. All
of this ‘‘happened.’’ The command evolved
into USCENTCOM (United States Central Com-
mand). The capabilities we programmed were
used in the first Gulf War.
I’ve done both building and cutting; it’s
more fun to build. To do so, however, requires
organizations and people pulling together.
There were fine innovations from the Marines,
particularly General P.X. Kelly, who later be-
came Commandant, from mobility folks, and
others. We would stitch such ideas together as
part of a capability-building strategy. We worked
closely with the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, Robert Komer (he was my ‘‘second boss’’
since I did both program analysis and strategy
work).
Our success was partly luck. In 1980, the po-
litical winds changed andDoD gotmoremoney.
The things that we’d studied and suggested
were on the shelf and ready, so they could be
moved into the budget almost overnight. How
often in a career do you get that?!!
Bob Sheldon:Were you doing this during the
transition from the Carter administration to the
Reagan administration, when the plus-ups
came in?
Paul Davis: There was a big shift in the
Carter administration itself, from continuing
decline to badly needed real growth as of FY
1980. The Reagan administration threw more
money at the problems. In their heart of hearts,
the incoming officials probably wanted to kill
everything from the previous administration
(standard foolishness during transitions, for
both parties). But the things that we were
recommending—even if from the previous
administration—were attractive. The new offi-
cials liked them and wanted to do more.
Bob Sheldon:Did you travel to theMideast to
look at any of those basing concepts?
Paul Davis: No, my staff officers did, but I
did not.
By the way, the best story about that period
was that in our analysis we had no notion about
being able to predict the future. Wewere talking
about vacuums to fill with capability. So we lit-
erally had a scenario in which Saddam Hussein
invaded Kuwait. Everybody outside our group
said, ‘‘That will never happen!’’ We had a sce-
nariowhere the Sovietswould invade Iran, even
though they hadn’t done that in decades. ‘‘Ri-
diculous.’’ We had an Arab-Israeli scenario,
and so forth. We were looking for common pat-
terns of what capabilities made sense. In the
early part of this period, the conventional wis-
dom in the rest of the Pentagonwas that conceiv-
ably some capability against Saddam Hussein
might be useful, but probably not. The Soviets?
Impossible! But then the Soviets invaded
Afghanistan and, overnight, conventional wis-
dom flipped and senior leaders focused entirely
on the Soviet threat to Iran. But the war that ac-
tually occurred 10 years laterwaswhen Saddam
invaded Kuwait. This shows the goofiness of
conventional wisdom and the strength of analy-
sis that transcends scenarios. If you do the right
analysis, you can do smart things without know-
ing how the capabilities will be used.
Bob Sheldon: Were you still working in that
office in the early 1980s?
Paul Davis: Through 1981. For much of the
last year, I headed regional programs more gen-
erally. Just like today, there were cosmic issues
for the Secretary of Defense. The US has a bunch
of possible threats. How should the DoD pre-
pare for all the possible threats? Could we as-
sume that wars would be separated? How do
you pay for things? I think we did a reasonable
job. I certainly respected the people who were
making the decisions and understanding the is-
sues. Under Carter, this was Secretary Harold
Brown and his Under Secretary for Policy,
Robert Komer; early in the Reagan administra-
tion it was Frank Carlucci, the Deputy Secretary
(he later became National Security Advisor, and
then Secretary). Thereweremany good officials,
in all three administrations during which I was
in government (Ford, Carter, Reagan).
Bob Sheldon: So you were there until 1981.
Where did you transition to next?
Paul Davis: I got a telephone call from Steve
Drezner, a Vice President at RANDwhowanted
to take me to lunch. As a lark, I said sure, so we
had lunch. He gaveme all sorts of reasons why I
should come to RAND. I hadn’t considered
leaving but thought to myself, ‘‘I’ve been at this
a few years now and have had a good time.
Maybe it’s time to do something different.’’ I
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also recognized that the work in OSD, while
consequential and sometimes heady, was not
building deep intellectual capital. So I went to
RAND. I considered another job offer, but RAND
was themost attractive. Doing so opened another
era in my life with lots of very interesting, very
different problems, and good colleagues.
Bob Sheldon: So you were used to living in
DC area, where the real estate’s high priced,
and you went to Santa Monica where it’s even
higher-priced. Was that a shock to your system
moving out to California?
Paul Davis:When it came time to move and
buy a house, the interest rates were 17 percent.
Another shock was the change of climate. My
wife was initially ‘‘not real happy’’; we moved
in August, which is not the best time to move
to the Los Angeles area. We discovered, how-
ever, that it was really pleasant. Now she prob-
ably wouldn’t want to move to anyplace cold.
Bob Sheldon: Did the move to California dis-
rupt your family’s life?
Paul Davis: Not too bad. Our daughter was
only 11 or 12, not in high school where I think
moves are particularly hard.
Bob Sheldon:What did you start out working
on there at RAND?
Paul Davis: The first big project was for
AndyMarshall, the Director of Net Assessment.
In 1980, a Defense Science Board had postulated
the need for an improvement in wargaming and
analysis that would go all the way from conven-
tional to nuclear. They had a grandiose descrip-
tion. The DoD decided to do it, with personal
approval of the Secretary of Defense. Andy
Marshall was put in charge. Therewas a compe-
tition before I got there and RAND won the
competition with an innovative scheme of
building a simulation that included artificial in-
telligencemodels optionally, so you could either
have people-in-the-loop or models-in-the-loop.
I arrived on the scene and was recruited to be
in charge. My deputy was Jim Winnefeld, a re-
tired admiral, wiseman, and gentlemanwho just
died last week. He was the father of Admiral
Winnefeld, who was Vice Chairman of the JCS
from 2011 to 2015.
The result, the RAND Strategy Assessment
System (RSAS), was a terrific effort technically
and analytically. We hadmodels making cosmic
decisions for the Soviet Union and the United
States (and their allies), and for third countries;
we had joint combatmodels for everything from
little contingencies to multitheater conflict that
might escalate to general nuclear war. By about
1987 it was all working and I moved on, al-
though the project continued under Bruce
Bennett. This had required an enormous effort
by a large and very talented team.
As intended, we deployed the system into
government. It was used for some years to run
Title 10 wargames, for education at several mil-
itary schools, and so on. That said, it was not re-
ally used well for what Andy Marshall had had
inmind initially.We did some of the highly clas-
sified analytic wargaming of nuclear war within
RAND, as well as the escalatory transitions
from conventional war, but there was no real
market for such things in the DoD. The various
offices represented on the project’s steering
group were far more interested in conventional
conflict and conventionalmodels. Themore inno-
vative features of the RSAS fell away over time.
Ultimately, the government was just not
a suitable place for something as sophisticated
as the RSAS. Despite heroic efforts, it was too
complex with a lot of PhD-level work behind
it. Within the USG (US Government), it was typ-
ically used for relatively standard scenarios.
When we’d train up a sharp young officer in
the Pentagon, who understood the system, he’d
be promoted and shipped out. As for the most
innovative aspects, with the national-command-
level and military-command-level models, the
USG lacked the interest and, bluntly, was unable
easily to accommodate the need to have versions
that represented contrary-view images of the So-
viet Union. We did such work within RAND for
Andy Marshall, but it didn’t really deploy well.
The Soviets then turned belly up and interest in
the system went away in the early 1990s.
Aside from the Soviets going away, Andy
had concluded that human gaming was a more
efficient way to get at many of the issues (e.g.,
escalation dynamics and even some aspects of
nuclear war fighting) than was complex simula-
tion. I had reached the same conclusion; I found
the complexity to be too burdensome and
turned back to simpler methods.
Nonetheless, we had used the system for
sizable studies for the Under Secretary for Pol-
icy and Andy Marshall. The most influential
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aspects were recommendations for conven-
tional arms control in Europe—first, for NATO
to take a hard line on having the Soviets asym-
metrically reduce forces and, later, to redirect
emphasis to strategically important ‘‘opera-
tional arms control’’ that would reduce the
likelihood of surprise attacks, rather than
confidence-building measures of a more cos-
metic character. As it happens, Gorbachev took
unilateral actions and the issues became moot.
The combat model from the RSAS became
the Joint Integrated Contingency Model (JICM),
which is still used today within DoD. In
RAND’s usage of it, we included ‘‘soft’’ aspects
of war (e.g., qualitative factors to represent low
fighting effectiveness for given equipment),
aggregate effect of maneuver rather than unre-
alistic attrition battles, and—most important—
multiscenario analysis exploring the consequences
of the numerous key parameters. This introduc-
tion of exploratory analysis was unique and laid
the basis for the much more sophisticated un-
certainty analysis that we have today. Key fig-
ures in developing JICM were Bruce Bennett
and Carl Jones.
Bob Sheldon: What next?
Paul Davis: I moved on to other things after
the RSAS had fallen together in 1988. In particu-
lar, I began worrying about the post-Cold War
era and rogue-state problems. As I mentioned
earlier, I also wanted to use methods and
models that skimmed the cream of what we
had learned, with much less complexity.
John Arquilla (now at NPS, the Naval Post-
graduate School) and I did a very interesting
study for the Joint Staff that anticipated much
of what Saddam Hussein did in 1990–1991. It
involved what I call simple ‘‘cognitive models
of the adversary.’’ During the 1990 crisis and
1991 Gulf War, we briefed and had other ex-
changes with General Schwarzkopf and senior
leaders in the Pentagon based on this work.
The early 1990s was mostly about rethink-
ing defense planning for the post-Cold War
era. I organized and edited a big 1994 RAND
book, New Challenges for Defense Planning, that
had 23 chapters by senior RAND staff about
how things were or should be changing. One
of my own themes was that DoD should shift
to a system that seriously confronted uncer-
tainty. This meant more scenarios, more focus
on capabilities, and a complete rethinking of
the building blocks used by the Services (those
had been corps/division, wing, carrier battle
group (CVBG)). This was radical back then,
and also threatening.
The late 1990s were even more exciting. That
was the period that old-timers like yourself will
remember. This was a period of transformation—
people likeViceAdmiralArt Cebrowski—hewas
very influential in the Joint Staff and President
of the Naval War College. He later headed up
the Office of Transformation. It was a period in
which the Joint Staff was very forward looking
(Joint Vision 2010, etc.). Some people could see
that we were in a period where technology
was changing things, but you had to have all
the other things too. You had to have new con-
cepts of operation and new ways of organiza-
tion. Andy Marshall championed this view. A
few senior military leaders, like Cebrowski
and Admiral William Owens, were the heroes
leading the charge from inside the Pentagon
(sometimes with a degree of exaggeration and
hype). Other ‘‘pushers’’ were outside (I remem-
ber fondly two Defense Science Boards in 1996
and 1998).
All of this was upmy alley, as I was thinking
about implications for defense planning, and
methods for doing so. One study in 1996 was
prescient: we had a baseline option of continu-
ing the existing force structure, but we had
others that moved with degrees of aggressive-
ness toward new-era forces with precision fires,
what amounted to network centricity, and new
‘‘building blocks’’ (brigades, squadrons, and dif-
ferently configured naval battle groups). We
paid for these with reduced manpower, but
maintained enough structure to deal with mul-
tiple overlapping contingencies (we did not
make the mistake of assuming that air power
could do everything). Most senior officials
were interested only in the baseline force, but
therewere exceptions such asAdmiralDonPilling
and Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig, who
clearly saw the need to be transforming, al-
though incrementally. The Air Force was also
moving along smartly to introduce the new pre-
cision fires, which it recognized was changing
matters drastically.
We also urged, in 1996, that the DoD take
a portfolio-balancing approach to defense
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planning. Two-war capability was a criterion
within that, but there should be a higher-level
construct. The eventual DoD version, in Secre-
tary Bill Cohen’s first Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR), was the Shape, Respond, Pre-
pare Now strategy. It was much easier than
previously to understand the role of the Navy
and why it merited the investment it had long
gotten; it was also recognized that the ‘‘Re-
spond’’ component required worrying about
numerous conflicts; and, finally, the ‘‘Prepare
Now’’ component was a (timid) first step to-
ward transformation.
Later, in the 2000s, I tried to codify a lot of
my thinking about ‘‘capabilities-based plan-
ning,’’ and to substantially develop themethods
for both exploratory analysis under uncertainty
and strategic portfolio analysis. I did some of
that work with Russell Shaver, a great analyst
(now retired), some of it for the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Lo-
gistics (Michael Wynne and then Kenneth Krieg).
The basic idea is to invest in a variety of ca-
pabilities with a variety of objectives in mind,
such as maintaining or promoting US security
interests in various regions, for the near, mid,
and long term. The issue becomes how best to
‘‘balance’’ the portfolio of investments to ad-
dress adaptively the many risks and opportuni-
ties that may arise. Secretary Robert Gates used
the language of rebalancing well.
Today, capabilities analysis and strategic
portfolio analysis are routine in parts of DoD. I
was asked about whether they are taught yet
in schools. I’ve taught them in the Pardee
RAND Graduate School but they’re not stan-
dard in many curricula to my knowledge. Port-
folio analysis, of course, originated in finance
and generated Nobel prizes. However, finance
is easier because fewer variables are at issue
(long-term capital accumulation and buffering
against the risks of short-term disasters) and
there is a wealth of relevant empirical data. In
contrast, national security planners don’t know
the probability distributions for the many possi-
ble challenges to arise in the decades ahead.
Further, they don’t have something as simple
as profit-making as an objective.
In the 2000s, of course, I also found myself
doing a lot of terrorism-related work, including
a 2002 study for the Director of DARPA about
whether there could be a deterrence component
of strategy against al-Qaeda and a late-in decade
review with Kim Cragin and other colleagues on
what social science told us about terrorism and
counterterrorism. That was very interesting and
provocative work, from my perspective.
Bob Sheldon: What have you done more
recently?
Paul Davis: Well, I continued the analytic
work relating to counterterrorism, particularly
in work with colleagues Eric Larson andAngela
O’Mahony. Some of that was qualitative but
structured, involving what I called the factor-
tree methodology, to include qualitative val-
idation with fresh case studies; some of it
involves a new uncertainty-sensitive approach
to social-science-informed causal modeling.
The word ‘‘causal’’ is important. To inform
strategy we need causal modeling, not just the
ubiquitous and oftenmodest and less-than-useful
statistical correlations.
A few years ago, I did a broad strategic
study with Peter Wilson that described what
we saw (and see) as a ‘‘perfect storm’’ of chal-
lenges for the US. We called many things right,
but—like a lot of people—we did not anticipate
Mr. Putin becoming a real problem again, and
we certainly did not anticipate ISIL (Islamic
State of Iraq and the Levant). Humility is impor-
tant in this strategic-thinking stuff. I recall look-
ing back to our 1994 book a few years ago. We
got a lot of things right, but—yikes—we sure
missed some other things. I did not see al-
Qaeda coming.
We’ve done a lot of different things at
RAND over the years. Most recently, I’ve been
working on information fusion with Walter
Perry, John Hollywood, and David Manheim
(a PhD student). The part that makes it interest-
ing is when you’re trying to combine very dif-
ferent kinds of information, qualitative and
quantitative, highly uncertain, speculative,
some of it literally dishonest, some of it deliber-
ately deceptive. Then what are the methods for
doing so that have some foundation in informa-
tion science? This has beenmind stretching and,
yes, fun.
Bob Sheldon: You’ve written a lot of reports
at RAND. What are your favorite ones, either
the ones you enjoyed the most working on, or
where you thought you had the most impact?
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Paul Davis: The most important has been
the continuing theme of planning under
uncertainty—confronting uncertainty without
hand-wringing.
Within that, I like the phrase ‘‘planning for
adaptiveness’’ or, in a more complex formula-
tion, planning for flexibility, adaptiveness, and
robustness (FARness). My work on this began
back in the 1980s with ‘‘multiscenario analysis’’
when itwas radical. Today there is amomentum
for doing such things, much of captured by
what some RAND colleagues call robust deci-
sion making.
The 1994 book that I mentioned apparently
had background impact, but it’s hard to trace it.
I know, however, that two derivative issue pa-
pers in 1996 and 1998 (done primarily with
David Gompert) were influential within OSD
and the Joint Staff. They affected both policy-
level and analytic-level language. The first,
Adaptiveness in National Defense, included the
transformation options I mentioned earlier,
and had a first-cut approach to strategic portfo-
lio analysis. Some of the ideas were reflected in
the Shape, Respond, Prepare strategy of the first
QDR and, much later, in the now-common ter-
minology of ‘‘balancing’’ and ‘‘rebalancing’’
the DoD portfolio, as discussed articulately by
Secretary Robert Gates. Taken together, these
things contributed to DoD’s move to capabilities-
based planning, although DoD’s implementa-
tion has been much more bureaucratic and
much less uncertainty sensitive than I had
hoped.
The 1998 issue paper, Transforming the Force,
urged exploiting the new technology. It recog-
nized that it was possible to reduce force struc-
ture and come out with more capability. It
included a crude diagram arguing that from
1998 until around 2012, the US could enjoy an
era inwhich everythingwould be dandy. There-
after, things would bemuchmore dicey because
of proliferated technology and China having
ascended. We’re now in that dicey era.
As a single report on defense planning, my
2014 monograph pulls together my previous
work and adds new features relevant to analysts
and analysis. This is Analysis to Inform Defense
Planning Despite Austerity.
It’s too early to tell, but I hope that the social
science work we’ve done has impact over time.
The idea of uncertainty-sensitive computational
models based on qualitative factor trees was, I
believe, a significant innovation. But we’ll see.
If we know enough, such models can be useful
for description, explanation, and seeing broad
patterns even though we can’t, a priori, confi-
dently estimate the factor values or the rules
by which factors combine to create effects.
Humans deal with such matters routinely in so-
cial settings: we avoid getting into danger zones
by not pushing ‘‘hot buttons’’; we take tentative
steps that we think will be positive, but then
reassess based on reactions and events. We
know that random things (moods, distractions,
or events we don’t know about) can change re-
sults. We recognize that we may read the situa-
tion wrong and will need to adapt.
Bob Sheldon: Some people erroneously think
that in the field of operations research (OR) you
have to have a degree in OR to be effective. But
historically some of the most influential people
in OR have started with degrees other than
OR. What was it about your chemical physics
background that allowed you to see problems
clearly and do useful analysis?
Paul Davis: I think that being a good analyst
is a matter of built-in talents plus a certain kind
of mind plus experience with ‘‘hard’’ problem
solving. Without naming names for fear of leav-
ing someone out, some of the first-class analysts
I have known over the decades have come from
physics, economics, engineering, mathematics,
chemistry, business administration, and, yes,
operations research. If we include ‘‘softer’’ but
rigorous forms of analysis, the list includes
law and political science. The people involved
have had multiple talents rather than just what
the name of their degree would suggest.
I don’t have deep credentials for academic
operations research. If you ask me about queue-
ing theory or optimization, I’ll point you to spe-
cialists in those tools. I see them as ‘‘just tools.’’
Many of the most important problems for ana-
lysts are at a level where problems are unstruc-
tured and the notion of optimization is silly
(something I once heard General Larry Welch
point out at a MORS meeting).
Bob Sheldon: Let’s backtrack. When was
your first involvement with MORS?
Paul Davis: Around 1980, when I was in the
government. It probably had to do with the
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strategicmobilityworking group; I gave a paper
and ran the working group at some meeting.
Over the years, I’ve spoken or otherwise partic-
ipated in a lot of the special meetings. Those did
not always exist. You, Bob, remember it was an
initiative to create more of the special meetings
and have greater depth, sometimes with written
papers.
Bob Sheldon: It started after MORS went
from two symposia a year to one.
Paul Davis: I thought that was good. MORS
has changed over the years, experimenting to
see what’s useful.
Bob Sheldon:One of your most valuable con-
tributions to the MORS special meetings is serv-
ing as the synthesis chair. That’s a challenging
job. How do you view that when you walk into
a special meeting, trying to synthesize and pull
it together and make sense of it?
Paul Davis: I don’t have a formula, but you
have to listen. Normally, though, it requires
more than listening—you usually have to do
some conceptual construction, because stapling
things together doesn’t usually do much and
only sometimes are the pieces just lying there,
ready to put together. Sometimes, diagrams
help, such as those Stuart Starr, FS, often used
well in meetings I recall.
Bob Sheldon: You were recognized by MORS
with theWanner Award in 1997. What was your
reaction to that?
Paul Davis: I was pleased and surprised. I
don’t know what actually instigated that, al-
though I imagine that it was the methods for
planning under uncertainty.
Bob Sheldon:More recently, in 2012 youwere
recognized as a MORS Fellow for your lasting
contributions to the Society. Your reaction to
that?
Paul Davis: I was really honored. But one of
the things that bothered me is that, although
I’ve contributed to MORS in many ways over
the years, I have never paid my dues by doing
some of the burdensome things, like being a
President or Vice President. I’m not very good
at those things anyway, but in terms of service,
I hadn’t done asmuch as some. But when people
added it up, the substantive contributions ap-
parently made it okay. We do what we can.
Bob Sheldon: I know you’re familiar with the
person we consider MORS Fellow Number
One—Clayton Thomas. What are your thoughts
about Clay?
Paul Davis: I met Clay in the 1980s and had
good conversations with him over the years, but
regrettably never had a chance to work with
him directly. He exuded wisdom and thought-
fulness. I also recall that he would quietly ask
pointed questions, but they were intended to
be helpful.
Bob Sheldon: One of your roles at RAND is
you teach classes. How long have you been do-
ing that?
Paul Davis: Off and on since 1982. Lots of
different courses.
Bob Sheldon: What kinds of courses?
Paul Davis: Technology and policy analysis.
Defense planning. Terrorism. In more recent
years, I’ve taught a course about complex policy
problems that require modeling. For a long
time, I taught that with Dick Hillestad. It in-
cludes things like ‘‘How do you construct
systemsmodels?’’ ‘‘How do you deal with qual-
itative factors and values?’’ ‘‘How do you think
about detail?’’ ‘‘How do you deal with uncer-
tainty?’’ I have the students apply the course’s
lessons to a problem of their choosing, which
sometimes becomes their dissertation project. I
also teach some brainstorming methods, to help
with both divergent and convergent thinking.
Bob Sheldon: How many students do you
typically have?
Paul Davis: From four to 24. There’s been no
pattern. It’s a relatively small school and partic-
ipation depends on what other courses are be-
ing taught at the same time.
Bob Sheldon: You taught yourself systems
analysis. Have you read the systems analysis liter-
ature developed at RAND by Quade and others?
Paul Davis: Yes, with admiration.
Bob Sheldon:Did you have to relearn some of
the systems analysis while working at RAND?
Did it change your outlook?
Paul Davis: I had picked up or discovered
the more important things. When I looked at
the books in the 1980s, I found that they added
structure, depth, and subtlety, but I already
had the ideas. Perhapswhat impressedmemost
was better appreciating that what seemed to me
obvious wasn’t so obvious to others. That’s why
the early course in systems analysis had to be
created. Some people are better at such things
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than others. Russ Shaver (now retired) was
a favorite colleague at RAND for many years;
he was a great systems analyst with strong, non-
linear, creative intuition and, in addition, the
ability to be rigorous. As far as the Quade books,
I give them as suggested readings. They are bet-
ter for people who have gotten their hands dirty
and encountered the problems, and are ready to
ponder them seriously, than for someone who is
just starting.
Bob Sheldon: What other books would you
recommend for our MORS readers?
Paul Davis: I recommend Nobelist Daniel
Kahneman’s book, Thinking, Fast and Slow, for
graduate students. Another book, first pointed
out to me by a British student (an MD obtaining
a PhD at RAND), is perhaps best for someone
who has just been through an American opera-
tions research degree. It is a book by Rosenhead
and Mingers, Rational Analysis for a Problematic
World Revisited: Problem Structuring Methods for
Complexity, Uncertainty and Conflict. It’s about
what might be called ‘‘soft OR’’ and is an antidote
for overly mathematical attitudes about analysis.
Bob Sheldon:Do you have advice for analysts
and MORS?
Paul Davis: In my 2014 book I urge recogni-
tion of a new professional responsibility for
analysts: Instead of merely listing analysis as-
sumptions, analysts should: (1) routinely show
how results vary with all key assumptions and
disagreements, (2) routinely assess options for
FARness [flexibility, adaptiveness, and robust-
ness], showing the valueof affordablehedges even
in periods of austeritywhenhedgesmay seem like
luxuries, (3) do this comprehensibly to aid policy-
makers in converging on decisions and actions.
I believe that, without exaggeration, em-
bracing the admonition would be ‘‘revolution-
ary’’ to the way DoD analysis is performed.
Bob Sheldon:Aquestion fromDr. YunaWong:
What are your thoughts about howDoD analysis
has evolved over the years?
Paul Davis: Well in some respects, badly in
others. Big, detailed models are extraordinarily
important when they are valid (as in work for
NASA, for training simulations of combat, or
for technical, engagement, or evenmission-level
work). When they are not really valid or have
highly uncertain inputs (all the ‘‘scenario vari-
ables’’), detailed models can be counterpro-
ductive for framing and informing strategic
decision making. They get in the way of good
uncertainty-sensitive thinking. The intent
should be to develop capabilities that will prove
effective for a wide range of plausible scenarios
and circumstances therein. These will not usu-
ally be optimal for any particular case.
The solution necessarily involves models at
different levels of resolution: we need the de-
tailed models as well as the simpler ones. DoD
often doesn’t do a good job of having and deal-
ingwellwith families ofmodels. It alsowas enam-
ored for a long time with standardized kinetic
campaign models and databases, squeezing out
serious discussion of uncertainty, and squeezing
out agility and creative thinking. The recent redis-
covery of human gaming is welcome. I hope it af-
fects future approaches to modeling as well.
Bob Sheldon: Another question from Yuna:
What would be your advice for younger ana-
lysts who want to learn more about this career
field or develop themselves professionally?
Paul Davis: For civilians, an interesting job
in government is valuable even if for a limited
time. There is no substitute for having worked
with people who have to make real decisions
while dealing with complex problems and orga-
nizations. You come to admire and appreciate
the many civilian officials, military leaders,
and experts. Military officers, of course, learn
these matters routinely.
Crosscutting is good (for some of us). If you
have friends and tasks that have you doing dif-
ferent things over time,with different approaches,
you will either discover that it doesn’t suit you or
you will discover that you love it. Either is okay.
Specialists are fine. Ifwe go to adoctor for surgery,
we want a specialist. But you need to know
whether you’re a crosscutter.
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